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Abstract: Even though it does not seem really possible that traditional means of en-
hancing our moral capacities can be completely replaced by new biotechnolo-
gies, sometimes it says that we could make people moral or more moral just by 
employing biochemical or genetic engineering, implants1 or electrical stimula-
tion of the central nervous system or by administrating certain drugs that affect 
the brain. In the course of this article my main aim is to show that these hopes 
and expectations in moral bio-enhancement should be strongly reconsidered 
and debunked. Moral bio-enhancement is to be reconsidered because morality is 
a kind of experience that cannot be construed just through technologies, but re-
quires the capacity of learning to consider things from a general point of view, of 
developing a sensitivity able to perceive suffering and pleasure of other people.
Keywords: Enhancement, ethics, bioethics, technologies
Running head: Morality is a kind of experience that cannot be construed just 
through technologies: limits and hopes of moral bioenhancement
Introduction
We live in an international world marked by violence and aggression, 
where appeals to morality often prove to be either empty or however 
without any effect. Wars and genocide continue to devastate the conti-
nents and represent a dramatic problem. Slavery and other forms of op-
pression against religious minorities, ethnic groups and women are still 
widespread throughout the world and, together with poverty, are perhaps 
the clearest sign of injustice characterising our current reality2. To these 
 1 Karim Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, “Neuroethics, 7, 
2014, pp. 253-261, p. 254.
 2 David De Grazia, Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and What We (Should) Value in Moral 
Behaviour, “Journal of Medical Ethics”, doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-101157.
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evils, then, one must also add the extremely serious environmental crisis 
we are experiencing, which is also the result of our profound indifference 
when it comes to the life of future generations, about whom we do not 
appear to concern ourselves as we exploit the planet’s resources. These 
examples are sufficient to show the advantages which, at a moral level, 
bio-enhancement could offer to us and future generations. It is true that 
we already have and use moral enhancement instruments – such as, for 
example, education, socialisation, literature and cinema – but, with the 
help of bio-technologies, moral enhancement could be more effective3.
Even though it does not seem really possible that traditional means of 
enhancing our moral capacities can be completely replaced by new bio-
technologies, sometimes it says that we could make people moral or more 
moral just by employing biochemical or genetic engineering, implants4 or 
electrical stimulation of the central nervous system or by administrating 
certain drugs that affect the brain. In the course of this article my main 
aim is to show that these hopes and expectations in moral bio-enhance-
ment should be strongly reconsidered and debunked. one intervention 
can aim or intend to morally enhance a person, without being really effec-
tive, i.e, making people immediately moral (or more moral).
My scepticism towards moral bio-enhancement is not founded on 
doubt about the scientific and technological development in the area of 
human enhancement5. Today we can obtain only limited results from en-
hancing technologies, but I assume that in the future it will be possible to 
use interventions and drugs that allow us to modify profoundly human be-
haviours, dispositions and empathy6. I believe that moral bio-enhancement 
is to be reconsidered because morality is a kind of experience that cannot 
be construed just through technologies, but requires the capacity of learn-
 3 Kasper raus et al., On Defining Moral Enhancement: A Clarificatory Taxonomy, “Neuro-
ethics”, 2014, 7, pp. 263-273.
 4 Karim Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, “Neuroethics, 7, 
2014, pp. 253-261, p. 254.
 5 K. Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, cit., p. 254; K. raus et al., 
On Defining Moral Enhancement: A Clarificatory Taxonomy, “Neuroethics”, 2014, 7, pp. 263-273.
 6 However, according to Harris Wiseman, “the radical ambiguity of the various findings is 
such that the impact of these biological agents remains every bit as unpredictable as it is pro-
found. It can only be that context, and the larger psyco-social environmental conditions of the 
person involved, shape the influence of these biological factors to a tremendous degree. Disen-
tangling the effects of these biological factors from one another and from the variety of other sur-
rounding influences on moral functioning is going to be a weighty problem for those who wish to 
appropriate these chemicals as mechanisms by which moral functioning can be augmented.”, 
Harris Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain. The Limits of Moral Enhancement, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 2016, pp. 110-111.
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ing to consider things from a general point of view, of developing a sensi-
tivity able to perceive suffering and pleasure of other people and of imag-
ining in which way we can combine many divergent claims and interests.
In the debate on moral enhancement it has been suggested that we 
could make people moral mostly by modifying or enhancing their behav-
iour, dispositions or empathy. Therefore we will start discussing behav-
ioural moral enhancement and then we will pass to analyse dispositional 
or emotional enhancing and empathy enhancement.
Behavioural moral enhancement
The debate of moral bioenhancement discusses the possibility of pro-
ducing a powerful computer that is capable of monitoring thoughts, in-
tentions and desires and modifying them when it recognizes the presence 
of criminal designs or projects. The God machine represents the model 
of a behaviour bioenhancement: it does not modify people’s character or 
dispositions, but it intervenes just to prevent criminal acts (and there-
fore, we can add, just to restrict or promote certain acts and/or behav-
iour). A more realistic alternative could consist of a neural implant that 
restricts acts of violence7 or the consumption of specific drugs8. Howev-
er, even though this kind of bioenhancement could have important re-
sults and benefits for society, it cannot make people truly morally en-
hanced9. People would be unable to perform certain acts, but will retain 
their character. They will be prevented from acting immorally, but, as per 
Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson, they still have bad intentions10. Af-
ter all, we know that it is not enough to act in accordance with a certain 
moral standard or, more simply, have certain behaviour to be truly moral: 
one must also have an appropriate first-order disposition or attitude to 
be moral11. Indeed, we do not call an old sadist who by now does not in-
flict harm and suffering moral, just because he doesn’t have the strength 
to commit new aberrant crimes. And we do not call a young psychopath 
 7 D. De Grazia, Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and What We (Should) Value in Moral Be-
haviour, p. 6.
 8 K. Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, p. 255.
 9 D. De Grazia, Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and What We (Should) Value in Moral Be-
haviour.
 10 Julian Savulescu, Ingmar Perssons, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, 
“Monist”, 2012, 95, 3, pp, 399-421.
 11 K. Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, p. 255.
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who has been sentenced to prison moral. It is true that neither the old 
sadist nor the young psychopath commit crimes, but, even though they 
don’t commit crimes, they lack the appropriate moral dispositions. 
Moreover, the use of sedative gas can prevent someone from harming 
people, but, also in this case, we would not think that this is a case of 
moral enhancement: at the very least, moral bioenhancement must im-
prove people’s motivations12. Then, this kind of enhancement will pre-
vent people from learning from moral mistakes and, it does mean, will 
prevent personal and moral development: “If we didn’t see the conse-
quences of bad (or indeed of good) decisions, – John Harris rightly 
points out – how would we learn from them?”, this kind of enhancement 
“would attack agency itself, not just prevent bad decisions”13.
Dispositional moral enhancement
In the debate on moral enhancement it is also supposed that with tech-
nological development we could also make people moral, just by provid-
ing them with moral dispositions14. Behavioural enhancement does not 
change people’s dispositions or give people morally better dispositions: it 
just corrects their normal behaviour. However, we could enhance not the 
behaviour, but the moral dispositions15,16 and modify, as Thomas Douglas 
argues, the way they feel about their behaviour17: “My thought is that 
there some emotions – henceforth, the counter-moral emotions – whose 
attenuation would sometimes counts as a moral enhancement regardless 
 12 robert Sparrows, Better Living through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu and Persson on 
“Moral Enhancement”, “Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31, 1, 2014, pp. 23-32. 
 13 John Harris,…How Narrow the Strait! The God Machine and the Spirit of Liberty, “Cam-
bridge Quarterly of healthcare Ethics”, 2014, 23, pp. 247-260, p. 251. According Harris, there is 
also another problem: given that the context is not accessible to the God machine and the action 
produced is not only in the neurons, how can it be able to interpret which acts are wrong and 
which act are right?
 14 Mark Walker, Enhancing genetic virtue. A project for twenty-first century humanity?, “Pol-
itics and The life Sciences”, 28, 2, 2009, pp. 27-47; T. Douglas, Moral Enhancement via Direct 
Emotion Modulation: A Reply to John Harris, “Bioethics”, 27, 3, 2013, pp. 160-168.
 15 J. Savulescu, I. Persson, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, “Monist”, 
95, 3, 2012, pp. 399-421.
 16 I. Persson, J. Savulescu, The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to 
Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity, “Journal of Applied Philosophy”, 25, 3, 2008, 
pp. 162-177.
 17 Thomas Douglas, Moral Enhancement, “Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25, 3, 2008, 
pp. 229-245, 229. 
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of which plausible moral and psychological theories one accepted”18. This 
kind of result could be reached through particular medical treatments or 
drugs19, brain stimulation, implants, interventions of genetic engineering 
on the developing embryo or selecting the embryos on the basis of their 
genes20. Dispositional enhancement would not restrict the acts a person 
can perform, but would change his or her dispositions to perform an act: 
and, in addition to this, it “changes the way we feel about certain 
behaviours”21. A racist person who is behaviourally enhanced may be pre-
vented from harming people, but not from feeling hate towards people 
who do not belong to his community. A racist person who is disposition-
ally enhanced will no longer feel negatively towards people who do not 
belong to his community. However, although recourse to this kind of en-
hancement could be very useful in the future, it is difficult to think that 
we can make people “automatically” moral just by using bio-technologies 
and therefore by simply amplifying their “natural” dispositions. We have 
at least three reasons/arguments to defend this kind of conclusion.
Enhancing disposition and emotions does not necessarily produce 
moral actions
first of all, scientific and technological development could permit us 
to modify or enhance particular dispositions or emotions, without actu-
ally making people more moral. We can accept that “it is a general fea-
ture of all moralities that they require a degree of self-sacrifice and al-
truism – when and how much is dependent on the particular theory. 
But it is a prerequisite of moral action that one should sacrifice/con-
strain one’s own self-interest for some moral code for the benefit of 
others”22. However, by using bio-technology maybe we could make peo-
 18 Ivi, p. 231.
 19 D. DeGrazia, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and What We (Should) Value in Moral Be-
haviour, “Journal of Medical Ethics”, 40, 6, 2014, pp. 361-368, pp. 361-362.
 20 Jona Specker et al., The Ethical Desiderability of Moral Bioenhancement: a Review of Rea-
sons, “BMC Medical Ethics, 15, 67, 2014, pp. 1-17, p. 9; Molly Crockett, Moral Bioenhancement: 
a Neuroscientific Perspective, “Journal of Medical Ethics”, 40, 6, 2014, pp. 370-371; larry Arn-
hart, Can Virtue Be Genetically Engineered? “Polit life Sci” 2010, 29, 1, pp. 79-81. M. Walker ar-
gues “Engineering genetic virtue […] would mean promoting genes that influence the acquisi-
tion of the virtues”., M. Walker, Enhancing Genetic Virtue. A Project for Twenty-First Century 
Humanity?, “Politics and the life Sciences”, 28, 2, 2009, pp. 27-46.
 21 K. Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, p. 255.
 22 J. Savulescu, I. Persson, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, cit., p. 6.
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ple more ready to sacrifice their own interests, be less aggressive and vio-
lent, willing to cooperate with others, able to control their immediate sen-
timents or more empathetic. But, enhancing these dispositions does not 
make them automatically moral. If there is no “moral sensitivity”, readi-
ness to sacrifice own interests could become an important resource in car-
rying out wrong actions with maximum dedication. We can also accept 
the idea that a specific form of self-sacrifice is altruism, but altruism is not 
always compatible with the needs and requests of ethics. After all, we can 
also recognize that “agreeableness has a moderate heritable component”23 
and, for this reason, can be enhanced by using genetic engineering. But it 
is not true that “if the genes associated with agreeableness can be identi-
fied and enhanced, then a plausible conjecture is that there should be a 
corresponding increase in the virtue of caring in the population and re-
duction of the vice of uncaring”24. Indeed, I might have a strong disposi-
tion for altruism and self-sacrifice and be, therefore, more ready to help 
my family, but indifferent to other people. I.e, the simple fact that I am 
helpful and compassionate to my father, mother, brothers and sisters, and 
maybe friends, does not necessarily make me moral.
The same discourse applies if, instead of agreeableness or altruism, we 
think of truthfulness or justice, as disposition or attitude to avoid habitually 
cheating others. And also it applies to our willingness to cooperate25: the 
willingness to cooperate can be a sign of moral character, but it can reinforce 
group or community bonds and weaken care and attention for the others 
who cannot cooperate with us. Moreover, as every one of us can imagine, 
even a torturer has the ability to control impulses in order to prolong the ag-
ony and suffering inflicted on their victims. That is, the ability to control26 
their own impulses does not make people automatically moral: it depends on 
what kind of consequences it will produce on the other people and on the 
kind of moral sensitivity the person we are considering has. Then, we have 
to consider that too much self-control can have negative side-effects, be-
cause it can inhibit “desirable risk taking, spontaneity, and like enjoyment”27.
Moreover, we can also think that “progress in the chemical and elec-
trical enhancement of cognition, learning, memory, and decision making 
 23 M. Walker, Enhancing Genetic Virtue. A Project for Twenty-First Century Humanity?, cit., 
p. 33.
 24 M. Walker, Enhancing genetic virtue. A project for twenty-first century humanity?, p. 34.
 25 J. Savulescu, I. Perssons, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, p. 9. 
 26 Ivi, p. 9.
 27 James J. Hughes, Moral Enhancement Model of Character Development, “Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics”, 24, 2015, pp. 84-95, p. 90.
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will contribute to the enhancement of these moral capabilities”, but too 
much intelligence can have side-effects, for example it can lead to “per-
versely machine-like moral decisionmaking”28. “likewise – as Hughes 
underlines in a recent article – the use of excessive amounts of cognitive-
enhancing stimulants can overstimulate dopamine and norepinephrine 
and impair learning, memory, and neural plasticity”29. Then, a number of 
commonly-employed drugs can surely make people less able to inflict30 
serious harm31 (or to be much less aggressive) on other people32, but be-
ing less aggressive is not necessarily a virtue, because its value and virtue 
will depend on the circumstances and therefore on the consequences it 
can produce33. There could be the risk of becoming too complaint and 
submissive or of altering the social norm that promotes prosocial behav-
ior through punishment34. I.e, a strong reduction of aggression could 
have a negative impact on society or adversely affect it and produce how-
ever less desirable and fair outcomes. Then some “aggression may be 
necessary to excel in some venue in life, such as sport or other competi-
tive enterprise”35 or to defend own country against an enemy36.
Enhancing multiple dispositions does not necessarily produce a 
virtuous character
However, it has been told that this kind of problem could be overridden 
by a paradigm of enhancement aiming at improving multiple and interde-
pendent virtues37. However, even a multiple interdependent virtue en-
hancement paradigm – regardless of the technology we imagine – cannot be 
 28 J. J. Hughes, Moral Enhancement Model of Character Development, p. 91
 29 J. J. Hughes, Moral Enhancement Model of Character Development, p. 91.
 30 Crockett has affirmed that his findings “provide unique evidence that serotonin could 
promote prosocial behavior by enhancing harm aversion, a prosocial sentiment that directly af-
fects both moral judgment and moral behaviour” (M. Crockett et al., Serotonin Selectively Influ-
ences Moral Judgement and Behaviour Effects on Harm Aversion, “Phychology and Cognitive Sci-
ences”, 107, 40, 2010, pp. 17433-17438, p. 17433).
 31 De Grazia, Moral enhancement, freedom, 2014, pp. 361-362. 
 32 J. Savulescu, I. Perssons, Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine, p. 9.
 33 Sarah Chan, John Harris, Moral Enhancement and Pro-Social Behaviour, “J. Med. Ethics”, 
2011, 37, 3, pp.  130-131, p.  131; Michael Hauskeller, Better Humans? Understanding the En-
hancement Project, routledge, london 2014.
 34 K. Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, p. 255
 35 Ibidem
 36 H. Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain. Limits of Moral Enhancement, p. 106.
 37 J. J. Hughes Moral Enhancement Model of Character Development, p. 86.
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useful to make people moral, because morality is connected to our ability to 
imagine solutions which can support the interests, wellbeing and needs of 
people in an original way. The virtuous character does not have to adapt 
him- or herself to pre-constituted definitions of virtue, but must imagine, 
using sensitivity, in what way his or her behaviour can best avoid damage to 
people and promote their welfare38. Sometimes we make terrible mistakes 
and we have to reconsider our previous conclusions, and, by learning from 
the experiences, we can try new original solutions or take inspiration from 
other people and from their choices. But, often, mostly when we deal with 
different claims, there are no other paths: we have to imagine in which way 
we could combine many divergent interests. And this disposition is not ac-
quired by means of medication or a technology of enhancing our “natural” 
ability to reason or feel what other people feel. It is acquired just through 
experience, practice and through encouragement which the individual re-
ceives from his/her society in whose interest it is to have autonomous, en-
terprising and, above all, morally “responsible” citizens.
That is, the modern moral thought is now closely related with the idea 
each of us has to take the responsibility of his/her actions, by considering 
the consequences on the others. Therefore, reducing ethics to a matter of 
unthinking and immediate dispositions39 would do a disservice to the 
complexity of factors involved in moral functioning40.
Enhancing dispositions does not make people act for the right 
reasons41
Moreover, we can imagine situations in which we can modify disposi-
tions and sentiments that produce negative consequences for the other 
people involved. By using biotechnologies we could interfere with these 
people’s impulses and dispositions42: for example, mitigate aversion to 
 38 roger Crisp, Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue, “The Philosophical Quarterly”, 42, 167, 
1992, pp. 139-160; Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life, 
Beacon Press 1997.
 39 H. Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain. Limits of Moral Enhancement, p. 51; H. Wise-
man, Moral Enhancement –“Hard” and “Soft” Forms, “American Journal of Bioethics”, 2014, 14, 
4, pp. 48-49.
 40 H. Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain. Limits of Moral Enhancement, p. 53.
 41 “I take moral enhancement to involve enhancing our ability to think ethically (…), not 
manipulating the probability of some reacting in ways that others deem ethical”, J. Harris, Taking 
Liberties with Free Fall, “Journal of Medical Ethics”, 2013.
 42 H. Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain. Limits of Moral Enhancement, pp. 27-28.
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certain racial group or reduce aggression43,44. But also in these cases we 
are not necessarily improving people’s moral character, because they 
could lack the capacity to act morally, i.e. for right reasons. Even if now 
they no longer feel a strong aversion to certain racial groups or do not 
have violent aggressive impulses, they could not be truly moral, because 
they could not have the capacity to reflect on their behaviour and to 
praise it. In other words, those changes in dispositions and attitudes 
would not amount to moral enhancement at all without changes in peo-
ple’s personal moral reasoning45.
Those who defend the idea of moral bioenhancement think that “a 
virtue is a character trait that, generally speaking, produces good conse-
quences for others”46 and that “no specific psychological state […] is 
necessary for virtue” and propose a “externalist theory of virtue, which 
does not make an appeal to any special internal states as defining virtue, 
but refers only to the external consequences of traits of character”47, be-
cause, Walker says, “to insist that certain attitudes accompany the exer-
cise of such disposition is to misunderstand what is definitive about 
virtue”48. But, it is not enough to remove or enhance the feelings and 
disposition of people to make them moral, because virtuous behaviour 
does not coincide with natural dispositions that govern, in an immediate 
manner, human beings and their behaviour. What characterises morality 
is not the mere necessity of immediate reactions: morality presupposes 
the ability on our part to respond reflectively to events that occur and, 
starting from this, to ask ourselves how we must act and live, considering 
not just our personal interests but also the interests of other people49. 
 43 Ivi, p. 27.
 44 T. Douglas, Moral Enhancement, p. 231.
 45 J. Harris, Ethics is for Bad Guys! Putting “Moral” in Moral Enhancement, “Bioethics”, 
2013, 27, 3, pp. 169-173, p. 172. As John Harris says, “a second sense of responsibility, namely, 
accountability, is predicated on the idea that our decisions are own, are expressions of our will, 
and not merely the products of brute forces, whether natural, social or divine. In short, it as-
sumes that there is genuine power to choose behind governance and self-governance”. J. Har-
ris,…How Narrow the Strait!. The God Machine and the Spirit of Liberty, p. 250.
 46 M. Walker, Enhancing Genetic Virtue. A Project for Twenty-First Century Humanity?, 
p. 37.
 47 Alessio Vaccari, Hume’s Virtues and Moral Psychology, 2015 
 48 M. Walker, Enhancing Genetic Virtue. A Project for Twenty-First Century Humanity?, p. 37.
 49 As J. Harris says, an intervention that operates in this way has not to do with moral en-
hancement: “tinkering with emotions is not a form of moral enhancement at all. It is more like 
the threat of punishment: it may make immoral bahaviour less likely, but it does not enhance mo-
rality”, J. Harris, Ethics is for Bad Guys! Putting “Moral” in Moral Enhancement, pp. 3-4; J. Har-
ris, What It’s Like to Be Good, “Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics”, 2012.
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We cannot limit the moral consideration just to the people who we are 
connected with, but we have to recognize it in every person affected by 
our actions, regardless of the time and the place in which they live50. 
Naturally, we can have more strong feelings and passions towards some 
particular people. And naturally we do not intend to deny the value of 
sentiments towards particular people: to feel love for some people is not 
something that we are arguing is wrong. But we have to consider the cor-
rectness of our choices from an impartial perspective or from a firm and 
general point of view that permits us to evaluate which are those behav-
iours which other people could also accept and therefore endorse. It is 
this kind of experience that we call moral. If we do not have the capacity 
to assume, through personal development, supported by wider society, a 
critical point of view relative to one’s passions and sentiments, we might 
also do the right thing and also promote the people’s happiness, but we 
will not be really moral51. Indeed, a person is not moral if they lack the 
sentiments which permit them to approve their behaviour as something 
right52,53.
Enhanced Empathy
Savulescu and Persson argue that by enhancing empathy we could 
overcome our partiality towards people to belong to our family and 
friends and make people moral, that is able to act by considering their 
actions from a general point of view. There are almost as many defini-
 50 Henry Sidgwick, I metodi dell’etica, Il Saggiatore, Milano 1995.
 51 As John Harris says, “The sufficiency to have stood in man’s ability to explain and justify 
his choices in terms that fully account for and explain his actions”, J. Harris,…How Narrow the 
Strait!. The God Machine and the Spirit of Liberty, p. 251. fabrice Jotterand, “Virtue Engineering” 
and Moral Agency: Will Post-Humans still Need the Virtues?, “AJoB Neuroscience”, 2, 4, 2011, 
pp. 3-9: “While the manipulation of moral emotions might change the behaviour of an individu-
al, it does not provide any content, for example, norms or values to guide one’s behavioural re-
sponse”, p.  6; William Simkulet, On Moral Enhancement, “AJoB Neuroscience”, 3, 4, 2012, 
pp. 17-18.
 52 r. Sparrows, Better Living through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu and Persson on “Mor-
al Enhancement”, “Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31, 1, 2014, pp.  23-32. As Sparrow says, 
“Anyone who has had a few glasses of beer knows that drugs can make us feel love where we 
would otherwise feel apathy or brave where we would normally be scared. (…) A stiff shot of 
whiskey might allow us to summon up the “courage” required to act morally in some particular 
instance but it will not succeed in making us ‘more moral’”.
 53 r. Sparrows, Better Living through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu and Persson on “Mor-
al Enhancement”, cit.
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tions of empathy as there is research on this topic. By following Michael 
Slote’s analysis, we can say that “empathy involves having the feeling of 
another (involuntarily) aroused in ourselves, as when we see another 
person in pain. It is as if their pain invades us, and Hume speaks, in this 
connection, of the between what one person feels and what another 
comes to fell”54. In other words, “we ‘empathize’ with others when we 
have (1) an affective state (2) which is isomorphic to another person’s 
affective state, (3) which was elicited by observing or imagining another 
person’s affective state, and (4) when we know that the other person’s 
affective state is the source of our own affective state”55. I do not intend 
to cast doubts on the important role of empathy for morality. But empa-
thy is not just a passive disposition or tendency that governs human be-
ings in an immediate and uncontrolled way: it is actually an active incli-
nation, not least because it can become much more precise and refined 
if cultivated and trained. Therefore we might also imagine that in the 
future the bio-technologies could amplify and spread our “natural” em-
pathetic dispositions as much as we want. However, bio-technologies 
cannot offer that essential refinement and training of our empathy that 
we can reach by being in relation with other people. Just by comparing 
ourselves with other points of view and the life experiences of other 
people we might develop a more adequate moral sensitivity. What oth-
er people tell us about their experiences and our behaviour and charac-
ter allows us to develop greater ability to see the problems, and hence 
perceive important aspects of the situation which up to that point we 
had been unaware of. In other words, empathy is a social practice 
“through which ordinary people encountering one another in shared 
places (…) are nevertheless capable of coordinating with others and 
producing morality, together without the artificial machinations of po-
litical coercion, philosophy, religion or formal education”56. And it 
does mean that we can develop refined empathy just through a lifetime 
spent gazing into the mirror of society57.
on the other hand, the fact that empathy is not an immediate dispo-
sition or reaction, but a dynamic that effects agents as members of their 
society in which they live and, therefore, a social practice is strongly con-
 54 Michael Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, routledge, london 2007, p. 13.
 55 Tania Singer, Claus lamm, The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, “Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci.”, 
1156, 2009, pp. 81-96, p. 82.
 56 fonna forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Simpathy, Cambridge university 
Press, Cambridge, 201, p. 62.
 57 f. forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Simpathy, p. 90.
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firmed by the fact that our empathetic capacity can be strongly affected 
from social prejudices and ideologies. That is, we should also take into 
account that empathy can be easily manipulated58,59. once the other 
people are dehumanized it is more difficult to empathize with (them), 
and killing them is no longer an immoral act, but an act of decency and 
duty. I.e., the physical proximity (or an virtual proximity induced in 
people by using the new enhancing technologies) can be insufficient to 
stimulate or explain empathy. Then, empathy cannot just be easily ma-
nipulated or affected by important social habits, but it might also be 
strongly limited and turned off by “over-exposure”. The emotional im-
pact of viewing images of catastrophes daily is seldom studied. But, as 
Ann Kaplan recently wrote, “Empathic sharing entails closeness but 
may lead to the over-arousal of vicarious trauma, or the sentimentalism 
of empty empathy”60.
Moreover, empathy does not coincide with morality, because we can 
have empathic capacity, without having morality or a general and firm 
point of view. Indeed, the enhancement of empathy could strongly rein-
force partiality towards own family and indifference towards people who 
do not belong to our narrow group61. That is, more empathetic people 
can be less fair than non-enhanced people, because empathy can be felt 
“towards a specific target, which could lead to a failure to help people 
other than that target – or even actions that help the target at the expense 
of others”62. for this reason, the optimal solution would be bioenhance-
ment that permits enlarging (widening) the circle of empathy, but “this 
variant of dispositional enhancement does not, for the moment, seem 
available to us”63.
In addition, there is not an intrinsic necessity to find a benevolent ac-
tion where there is empathy. Indeed, this sentiment is not confined to the 
virtuous and human: “though they perhaps may feel it with the most ex-
quisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the 
 58 Jesse Prinz, Is Empathy necessary for morality, p. 226.
 59 f. forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Simpathy, Cambridge university Press, 
Cambridge, 2011 p. 151.
 60 Ann Kaplan, Empathy and Trauma Culture: Imaging Catastrophe, in Amy Coplan, Peter 
Goldie (Eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, oxford university Press, 
oxford 2011, pp. 255-276, p. 275.
 61 r. Sparrows, Better Living through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu and Persson on “Mor-
al Enhancement”, cit.
 62 K. Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, p. 257.
 63 Ibidem
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laws of society, is not altogether without it”64. Conversely, it could permit 
a sadist to inflict more suffering on victims, because he/she is more able 
to understand better what can make them feel pain. Then, a person can 
empathize with someone else, but care just for his own interests, because 
he lacks the sensibility to react to what happens to other people65,66. In 
this way, empathy should be considered only as a premise/component of 
morality, requiring the inclination or tendency to contrast one’s own, 
merely egoistical attitudes and therefore the ability to see things in an im-
partial or reflective way67.
This confirms that appropriate empathy cannot be obtained just 
through enhancing new biotechnologies because it seems to be strictly 
related to our capacity to recognize our limits and prejudices. only by 
training this empathy, and therefore our (moral) sensitivity, can we 
hope to fully understand the lives of other people and the (hidden) rea-
sons for their behaviour. We are a long way – therefore – from those 
perspectives that assume people can become moral only through en-
hancement produced by technologies. We do not understand how, 
through bio-technological interventions, enhanced individuals should 
be able to quickly recognize and know which action is right and be mo-
tivated to act as a result, without any hesitation, uncertainty or second 
thoughts. If empathy is this kind of social process, we doubt that its re-
finement can really be realised through biotechnological enhancement. 
We could have better chances to reach it through education, literature 
and movies, which open up a variety of lifestyles and situations to the 
individual68.
Conclusion
Therefore, next biotechnologies will not even be able to make us auto-
matically moral69. We can already foresee that in the future it may be 
possible to develop interventions or substances which will enhance our 
 64 A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 11.
 65 J. Prinz, Is Empathy necessary for morality, p. 219.
 66 Ivi, p. 221.
 67 Eugenio lecaldano, Simpatia, raffaello Cortina, Milano 2013, pp. 168-169.
 68 f. forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Simpathy, Cambridge university Press, 
Cambridge, 2011 p. 145.
 69 B.E.E. fröding, Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and Good Life, “Neuroethics”, 4, 
2011, pp. 223-234.
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cognitive and empathetic abilities. And we can also foresee that people 
with enhanced cognitive and empathetic abilities will have a greater op-
portunity to behave in positive ways, reducing, for example, those ways 
of behaving and dispositions that cause suffering to others. However, 
quite apart from the level of scientific and technological development we 
might achieve, we can never make human beings virtuous by simply us-
ing interventions or medications that act on their biological nature. Tra-
ditional education systems of the type we have used to date are also nec-
essary. However, this does not mean that bioenhancement cannot play 
any role for morality. Education, socialisation, literature and cinema are 
important moral enhancing instruments – but, with the help of biotech-
nologies, their results could be more effective.
Moreover if a person, for example, already has moral attitudes, behav-
iour-altering effective enhancement could help him to resist the tempta-
tion to act badly. or if a person has negative biases towards some persons 
or group of people, enhancement could help him to lose these biases to-
wards these people70. In other words, bioenhancement can be useful 
against the “weakness of the will”, which does thwart a person from act-
ing on what they think is moral and right71,72. In these terms, bioenhance-
ment could produce moral enhancement and therefore make people mor-
al, by making the people’s motivational dispositions stronger. Indeed, we 
can recognize that in order to act morally it is necessary to have the ap-
propriate reasons regarding what represents a truly moral action. Howev-
er, sometimes having correct beliefs or sentiments about what is morally 
required may not suffice, because our moral beliefs can lack motivational 
force73. We are not speaking about turning people into moral robots just 
by changing or altering their dispositions, emotions or behaviour “but 
rather just giving persons who feel in need of assistance a ‘nudge’ in the 
right direction”74.
It is true that the moral enhancement would not be achieved by per-
sonal effort and therefore it could be seem that a person who is virtuous 
by means of enhancement is not truly moral, as a doped athlete cannot 
 70 K. Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, p. 260.
 71 T. Douglas, Moral Enhancement, p. 229. 
 72 T. Douglas, Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth, “Neuroethics”, 2014, 7, 
pp. 75-91, p. 76.
 73 T. Douglas, Moral Enhancement Via Direct Emotion Modulation: A Reply to John Harris, 
p. 162.
 74 H. Wiseman, The Mith of the Moral Brain, p. 52.
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be considered truly a sportsman75,76. But the doped sportsman breaks 
the constitutive rules of the sport and makes it more difficult for the 
other athlete to win by becoming morally excellent by means of en-
hancement technologies and this does not hinder other people from be-
coming moral. Then “The goodness of my intentions, dispositions or act 
may depend on their consequences, their coherence, or their general ac-
cordance with some moral principle. But the goodness does not seem to 
depend on how we acquired these intentions”77 because it is very diffi-
cult to know how we acquire intentions or dispositions78. Moreover, 
even if exerting effort can confer some moral value on one’s actions, it 
could be argued that the morally worthiest actions or people are those 
who, when they face moral choices, are able to act morally well without 
significant effort79.
Then, we can also accept the idea that attenuating or changing the 
main problematic emotions or dispositions “may allow an agent to engage 
in correct practical reasoning processes when that would not otherwise 
have been possible”80. These interventions have been described as moral 
enhancement: “even if we accept that reasoning processes are the only 
motives susceptible of moral appraisal, attenuating an emotion might still 
count as a moral enhancement. Though emotions may lie outside the will, 
they may interfere with its exercise by corrupting reasoning processes”81. 
However, the fact that we could remove a lot of sentiments or emotions 
that prevent correct practical reasoning (for example, racial or aggressive 
dispositions and sentiments) is just the preliminary condition for the 
agent to act morally and above all to recognize the moral unacceptability 
of certain behaviours. Therefore, in this case it seems premature to talk of 
moral enhancement: even if we cancel or modify his/her morally unaccep-
table sentiments and emotions, the agent has yet to demonstrate that he 
(or she) is really a morally better person. However, there is no doubt that 
 75 T. Douglas, Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth, pp.  84-85: “It might be 
thought that, when an individual could achieve a given increment in moral conformity thought 
either undergoing a brute conformity enhancement or engaging in deliberation, the brute confor-
mity enhancement will invariably involve exerting less effort. If this is so, then we might have 
good grounds to suppose that brute conformity enhancements are less conductive to moral 
worth than typical deliberative conformity enhancements”.
 76 K. Jebari, What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?, p. 259.
 77 Ibidem
 78 Harris Wiseman, The Mith of the Moral Brain, p. 50.
 79 T. Douglas, Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth, p. 85.
 80 T. Douglas, Moral Enhancement, p. 232
 81 Ibidem
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interventions that reduce or cancel problematic emotions or dispositions 
could permit people to develop a moral perspective, because they could 
consider things without being influenced by biases and prejudice.
